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This article examines the effects of collective layoff announcements on sales and marketing-mix elasticities, accounting for supply-
side constraints. The authors study 205 announcements in the automotive industry using a difference-in-differences model. They
find that, following collective layoff announcements, layoff firms experience adverse changes in sales, advertising elasticity, and
price elasticity. They explore the moderating role of announcement characteristics on these changes and find that collective layoff
announcements by domestic firms and announcements that do not mention a decline in demand as a motive are more likely to be
followed by adverse marketing-mix elasticity changes. On average, sales for the layoff firm in the layoff country are 8.7% lower
following a collective layoff announcement than their predicted levels absent the announcement. Similarly, advertising elasticity is
9.8% lower and price elasticity is 19.2% higher than absent the announcement. Conversely, layoff firms typically decrease
advertising spending in the country where collective layoffs have occurred, yet they do not change prices. These findings are
relevant to marketing managers of firms undergoing collective layoffs and to analysts of collective layoff decisions.
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Collective layoffs—the simultaneous termination of the labor
contracts of a large group of workers—are common in many
Western societies (Datta et al. 2010). In Europe alone, 556
collective layoffs were announced between December 2018
and November 2019, involving more than 250,000 employees
(Eurofound 2019). In addition to their societal implications,
collective layoff decisions have an immense impact on the
firms that initiate them.
Management scholars have studied the financial conse-
quences of collective layoffs for downsizing firms (“layoff
firms”) as well as for their employees (see, e.g., Guthrie and
Datta 2008; Morrison and Robinson 1997; Shah 2000). In mar-
keting, prior research has studied various aspects of customer or
investor response to collective layoffs (see Table 1). These stud-
ies, whichmostly focused on layoffs of customer-facing employ-
ees, have shown, for example, that downsizing can increase
customer uncertainty, decrease firms’ customer orientation and
customers’ positive perceptions of the brand, and decrease cus-
tomer satisfaction (Habel and Klarmann 2015; Homburg, Klar-
mann, and Staritz 2012; Subramony and Holtom 2012).
The present research complements this prior work in man-
agement and marketing by being the first to empirically
demonstrate the effects of collective layoff announcements
on demand and the effectiveness of its drivers (i.e.,
marketing-mix elasticities). Given that termination of employ-
ment, particularly of large numbers of people, typically evokes
negative connotations, it seems reasonable to expect that layoff
announcements should have negative, rather than positive,
effects on the layoff firm’s demand. Nevertheless, we do not
know whether such negative demand effects are universally
present (i.e., in how many cases do collective layoffs typically
lead to lower demand?) and what the magnitude is of such
demand effects (i.e., are these effects typically very large or
typically rather small?). Moreover, the measurement of these
effects is not straightforward, as the methodology used must
control for factors such as production capacity constraints,
which are likely to result from staff downsizing, as well as for
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potentially endogenous relationships between collective layoff
announcements and various marketing decisions that might
influence demand.
The effects of collective layoffs on the elasticities of
marketing-mix components (e.g., advertising and price elasti-
cities) are also unknown at present and are not simple to pre-
dict. For instance, consider advertising. On the one hand, a firm
that announces a collective layoff may create uncertainty
among consumers (Homburg, Klarmann, and Staritz 2012);
as a result, consumers may rely more heavily on the firm’s
advertising as a source of information that might mitigate such
uncertainty—thereby increasing advertising elasticity. On the
other hand, a firm that announces a collective layoff may be
viewed as being unfair to workers (Skarlicki, Ellard and Kelln
1998), making the firm less likeable and trustworthy—thereby
decreasing advertising elasticity (Colicev et al. 2018, Van
Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). Given that such opposing
forces are at play, the extent to which firm marketing instru-
ments (e.g., advertising) are expected to dampen any adverse
demand effects caused by the announcement of a collective
layoff is not obvious. Moreover, thus far, the marketing liter-
ature has given no empirically validated guidance in this
regard. This study aims to provide such insights, toward sup-
porting firms’ decision making with regard to marketing instru-
ments in the country where the collective layoffs take place.
Taking a broader perspective, this article complements the
scholarly insights provided by prior studies on the commercial
consequences of other types of firm crises. For instance, pre-
vious research has investigated the impact of product harm
crises (e.g., Cleeren, Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Liu and
Shankar 2015), firms’ violations of ethical or moral norms such
as sweatshop operations (Bartley and Child 2011; Huber et al.
2010), or negative news on celebrities who have endorsed a
particular brand (Knittel and Stango 2013). However, collec-
tive layoffs have several unique characteristics that distinguish
them from other crisis types, and thus, the commercial conse-
quences of such layoffs warrant specific consideration.
First, while firms do not purposefully initiate most types of
brand crisis (e.g., a product harm crisis, negative news on
celebrities who have endorsed a brand), firms do initiate col-
lective layoffs themselves and, thus, typically have some level
of control over the timing, location, and communication of the
collective layoff. Such control may help the firm to contain the
potentially adverse outcomes of the layoffs ex ante.
Second, collective layoff announcements differ from other
crises in terms of the information they might convey about the
performance of the firm. For example, a product harm crisis, by
definition, indicates that the quality of a firm’s products has
decreased and may even endanger users’ lives. A collective
layoff announcement, in contrast, does not directly reflect on
the quality of the firm’s products, although the merit of the
firm’s prior actions, or its prospects, may be called into ques-
tion. Other crisis types, such as the emergence of bad news
about affiliated celebrities, might provide even less concrete
information about the firm—as they are not triggered by the
firm’s actions, let alone the quality of its products—yet
nevertheless affect consumers’ perceptions of the firm (e.g.,
owing to the mental association that they have established
between the firm and the affiliated celebrity).1
Third, in estimating the commercial consequences of col-
lective layoffs, one needs to control for potential supply con-
straints that the firm imposes on itself due to the layoffs.
Notably, such supply-side constraints might also come into
play during a product harm crisis (e.g., because of
production-line shutdowns), yet, to our knowledge, studies in
this domain have rarely taken them into account. In other crisis
types, supply-side constraints are less likely to affect the esti-
mation of commercial consequences.
With the aim of providing an initial empirical generalization
on the commercial consequences of collective layoffs, we
study 205 collective layoff announcements in the automotive
industry across nine major automotive markets (Austria,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) and 20 major brands, between
2000 and 2015, which led to the termination of the labor con-
tracts of more than 300,000 employees. Because we do not
necessarily observe the labor contract termination dates, we
consider the announcement as the event whose impact is of
interest (Palmon, Sun, and Tang 1997). Conceptually, this
approach suits our purpose—namely, to examine the commer-
cial consequences that unfold after consumers hear of the
firm’s decision to lay off employees. Another unique feature
of our study is that, in estimating the demand-side effects of
interest, we control for production capacity utilization on the
supply side (among other factors). In this way, we isolate an
obvious potential cause of a decline in sales: a drop in produced
supply.
We utilize a hierarchical Bayes estimation technique on a
difference-in-differences (DID) model for unit sales. Our
model specification enables us to estimate brand-specific elas-
ticities over time and across countries while controlling for car
model and time effects on sales, as well as production capacity
constraints. The model thus captures the effects of collective
layoff announcements on the sales of layoff brands and on their
advertising and price elasticities. The DID model addresses the
fact that collective layoff events do not occur randomly but
rather are endogenous (i.e., result from firm decisions). We use
a system of equations together with instrumentation to address
the endogeneity of advertising and pricing and to account for
common unobserved shocks that may influence sales, advertis-
ing, and price levels.
Our rich data together with our modeling framework also
enable us to explore the heterogeneity of our main effects of
interest (demand, advertising elasticity, and price elasticity)
across characteristics of the layoff announcements and to iden-
tify boundary conditions. From our analysis of the content of
1 In the case of bad news about affiliated celebrities, one could argue that the
firm should have better vetted the celebrities they endorse, yet these are
secondary concerns compared with direct performance concerns such as
those resulting from a product harm crisis.
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these announcements and the events they cover, we identify
three information components that an announcement typically
contains and that seem worthy of exploration: (1) motive (did
the firm motivate the collective layoff by a decline in demand
or by other reasons [e.g., a supply-side search for efficiency
gains]?), (2) nationality (is the firm domestic [and thus consid-
ered an in-group actor] or foreign [and thus considered an out-
group actor] to the layoff country?), and (3) layoff size (how
many employees are affected by the collective layoff?). While
we do not claim that this is an exhaustive set of factors that
might moderate the effects we explore, we believe that inves-
tigation of these factors can deliver some first insights that may
stimulate further research to shed light on mediation and mod-
eration processes regarding the commercial consequences of
collective layoffs.
We report the following findings, which are new to the
literature. First, using model-free evidence, we show that for
two-thirds of the collective layoff announcements in our sam-
ple, the sales of the corresponding brands in the layoff country
decreased in the year following the announcements as com-
pared with sales in the year before the announcements. The
mean drop in sales across all announcements was 6.6%. Our
model estimates enable us to demonstrate that, accounting for
all other effects in our model—including changes in marketing-
mix elasticities and changes in advertising spending by layoff
firms in the layoff country—sales for the layoff brand are 8.7%
lower following a layoff announcement than their predicted
levels absent the announcement.
Second, we observe that the marginal effects of collective
layoff announcements on advertising elasticity and price elasti-
city are significantly negative, indicating that consumers become
less sensitive to the advertising of the firm and more sensitive to
its prices. On average, advertising elasticity is 9.8% lower and
price elasticity is 19.2% higher (a more negative price elasticity)
than absent the announcement. These effects are moderated by
the layoff announcement characteristics we investigate.
Third, we show model-free evidence suggesting that firms
do not universally adopt a single dominant advertising spend-
ing strategy following collective layoff announcements (the
median change in spending is about 2%). However, our model
estimates reveal that firms typically spend less on advertising
(16% less, on average) than they would absent the announce-
ment in the layoff country during the year following a collec-
tive layoff announcement.
These findings are relevant to marketing managers in firms
that (plan to) announce collective layoffs. First, our findings
regarding the commercially adverse effects of collective lay-
offs suggest that marketing managers should claim their place
in the task forces that manage such layoffs, alongside func-
tional representatives of other areas, such as finance and oper-
ations. Second, given the adverse effects we find for
advertising elasticities, we recommend that marketers in a lay-
off country should allocate attention to their advertising
response. We show that firms typically spend less on advertis-
ing following a layoff announcement than what they would
have spent absent the announcement. As a result, the adverse
effects of collective layoffs on sales in the layoff country loom
larger not only because of lower advertising elasticity but also
because of lower spending. An alternative response could be to
increase advertising spending to compensate for the decreased
elasticity and to consider such higher ad spending in the layoff
country as a restructuring cost. For analysts, the present
research offers a methodological framework to assess commer-
cial consequences of collective layoffs and provides empirical
estimates based on a large number of events across multiple
countries, though constrained to one industry.
Conceptual Framework
As discussed previously, we focus our analysis on three out-
come variables: sales, advertising elasticity, and price elasti-
city. Figure 1 depicts our conceptual framework. It illustrates
how marketing-mix decisions—and specifically, decisions
with regard to advertising and price—influence firm sales
before and after a collective layoff announcement, and how
characteristics of the collective layoff communication affect
our outcome variables. We also include several control vari-
ables that may affect the sales of the layoff brand (for parallel
logic in the context of product-harm crises, see Cleeren, Van
Heerde, and Dekimpe [2013]).
The Effect of Collective Layoff Announcements on
Demand
We suggest that the effect of a collective layoff announcement
on sales may occur through two primary routes. First, a firm
that announces a collective layoff may create uncertainty
among consumers (Homburg, Klarmann, and Staritz 2012).
Such uncertainty might reflect, for example, the consumer’s
state of doubt about the continuance and the quality of the
relationship with the layoff brand. An increase in consumer
uncertainty may drive consumers to other brands, leading to
a loss of sales. We acknowledge that, in some cases, it is
possible that a collective layoff may have the opposite effect,
lowering consumer uncertainty and reaffirming consumers’
beliefs in the viability of a brand; nevertheless, in line with
prior evidence, we expect heightened uncertainty to be the
more common response to a layoff announcement (Homburg,
Klarmann, and Staritz 2012).
Second, a firm that announces a collective layoff may be
perceived as treating workers unfairly. First, collective layoffs
may represent a broken commitment by a firm to its workers;
indeed, decisions to initiate such layoffs are rarely a response to
individual employees’ failure to perform as expected but,
rather, are typically determined by general economic condi-
tions (e.g., labor costs) or firm health (e.g., low sales volumes,
financial losses) (Love and Kraats 2009; Skarlicki, Ellard, and
Kelln 1998). Second, collective layoffs typically affect the
socioeconomic conditions of vulnerable workers, who either
become unemployed or, if they remain employed by the firm,
have to settle for lower wages with less job security (Skarlicki,
Ellard, and Kelln 1998). In such cases, the announcement of
4 Journal of Marketing XX(X)
collective layoffs may alienate consumers who sympathize
with the affected employees (Klein, Smith, and John 2004),
making the brand less likeable and trustworthy. Alienated con-
sumers may avoid the brand themselves (i.e., individual action)
or encourage others to do so (i.e., collective action) (Bechwati
and Morrin 2003; Hirschman 1970; Klein, Smith, and John
2004), both leading to a loss in brand sales.
The Effect of Collective Layoff Announcements on
Advertising Elasticity
Our theorizing on the effect of collective layoff announcements
on advertising elasticity is grounded in the informative and per-
suasive roles of advertising (Ackerberg 2001; Byzalov, and Sha-
char 2004; Narayanan and Manchanda 2009; Narayanan,
Manchanda, and Chintagunta 2005). If the announcement of a
collective layoff creates uncertainty among consumers (as shown
by, e.g., Homburg, Klarmann, and Staritz [2012]), advertising
may offer a means of learning about the prospects of the layoff
firm and their capacity to continue their relationshipwith the firm
(Panagopoulos, Mullins, and Avramidis 2018). This informative
role of advertising in the presence of consumer uncertainty may
lead to an increase in advertising elasticity for the layoff firm in
the wake of the collective layoff announcement.
At the same time, if consumers consider collective layoffs to
be unfair to workers, making the firm less likable and trust-
worthy as a communication source, advertising may become
less persuasive (Chaiken 1980; Van Heerde, Helsen, and
Dekimpe 2007). Our empirical tests enable us to determine
whether, on average, the increase in the informative role of
advertising dominates the decrease in the persuasive role of
advertising or vice versa.
The Effect of Collective Layoff Announcements on Price
Elasticity
We expect collective layoff announcements to increase price
elasticity (such that an increase in price has a stronger negative
effect on demand). First, as theorized previously, collective
layoff announcements may increase uncertainty among consu-
mers regarding the future of their relationship with the firm.
Uncertainty regarding future interactions with the firm may
lead to higher price sensitivity among consumers (Chevalier
and Goolsbee 2009) and, thus, to stronger or more negative
price elasticity. Second, we theorized that consumers might
consider collective layoffs to be unfair to workers, which may,
in turn, decrease the perceived trustworthiness of the firm.
Lower trustworthiness of the firm may lead to higher price
sensitivity among consumers (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere
2002) and, thus, to a more negative price elasticity.
Other Variables
The extent to which collective layoff announcements elicit
adverse consumer response and influence marketing-mix elas-
ticities may vary across announcements. As discussed previ-
ously, we examine three collective layoff announcement
characteristics that might have a role in moderating these
effects: (1) whether the firm announcing the collective layoff
is domestic (i.e., has its headquarters in that country) or foreign
to the layoff country, (2) whether the collective layoff is
Marketing Mix:
• Advertising 
• Price
Before Collective Layoffs After Collective Layoffs
Sales
Marketing Mix:
• Advertising 
• Price
Sales
Control Variables:
- Production constraints
- Competitive sales
- Product-specific fixed effects
Collective Layoff Characteristics:
- Domestic vs. foreign layoff firm
- Demand vs. nondemand motivation
- Number of employees affected
Figure 1. Conceptual framework.
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motivated by a decline in demand or by other reasons (e.g.,
collective layoffs driven by a supply-side search for efficiency
gains; for examples, see Web Appendix A; Freeman and
Cameron 1993),2 and (3) the number of employees affected
by the collective layoff.
We consider the empirical study of these collective layoff
announcement characteristics as exploratory. Although there
are clear reasons why these characteristics are expected to
affect the commercial consequences of collective layoffs (as
we elaborate subsequently), it is difficult to postulate the direc-
tion and magnitude of said effects ex ante.
Domestic versus foreign firms. Media sources typically provide
richer coverage of domestic firms than of foreign firms, such
that consumers are likely to be more informed about the former
than about the latter. Therefore, consumers may experience less
of an increase in uncertainty following a collective layoff
announcement of a domestic firm than they would after an
announcement of a foreign firm (Rinallo and Basuroy 2009).
Consumers also perceive domestic firms as in-group actors and
foreign firms as out-group actors (Crilly, Ni, and Jiang 2016)
and, consequently, typically expect domestic firms to adhere to
higher standards of fairness toward domestic workers than for-
eign firms (Mendoza, Lane, and Amodio 2014). Therefore,
consumers may evaluate unfair behavior of domestic firms
(as they are in-group members) more negatively than unfair
behavior of foreign firms (as they are out-group members) (for
a similar logic, see Valenzuela and Srivastava [2012]). Thus,
for advertising elasticity we may expect that if it is a domestic
firm (rather than a foreign firm) that lays off employees, the
adverse effects of a collective layoff are stronger (i.e., due to
lower increase in customer uncertainty [informative role] and
higher decrease in likability and trustworthiness [persuasive
role] compared with foreign firms). For sales and price elasti-
city, the effect of being a domestic, rather than foreign, firm
depends on whether on average the smaller increase in cus-
tomer uncertainty counteracts the greater decrease in likability
and trustworthiness.
Collective layoff motive. When a firm indicates that a collective
layoff is motivated by a decline in demand, it may create doubt
in consumers’ minds regarding whether they will be able to
continue their relationship with the firm in the future (Hom-
burg, Klarmann, and Staritz 2012). Analysts and critics may
magnify and further broadcast the “firm-in-decline” message
and frame a perception of an uncertain future for the firm (Love
and Kraatz 2009). Conversely, consumers may consider a
decline in demand as a more justified reason for reducing man-
ufacturing capacity than, for instance, the search for cost effi-
ciency (i.e., the desire of the firm to increase profits). Most
notably, delocalization of manufacturing to countries with
lower labor costs has been the source of hot societal debate
and boycotts (Mojtehedzad 2019). Thus, the likeability and
trustworthiness of a firm that announces a collective layoff as
being motivated by a decline in demand may decrease less than
those of a firm that does not present such motivations for its
announcement (e.g., when the motive is the search for effi-
ciency gains). Thus, for advertising elasticity we may expect
that if decline in demand is mentioned as a motive for the
collective layoffs (rather than another motive), the adverse
effects of a collective layoff are weaker (i.e., due to greater
increase in customer uncertainty [informative role] and smaller
decrease in likability and trustworthiness [persuasive role]
compared with nondecline motives). For sales and price elas-
ticity, the effect of a demand-driven motive depends on
whether, on average, the greater increase in uncertainty coun-
teracts the smaller decrease in likability and trustworthiness,
compared with other motives.
Number of employees. The number of employees being laid off
is likely to be related to consumer awareness about, and the
salience of, the collective layoff announcement (Homburg,
Klarmann, and Staritz 2012). Thus, it is likely to moderate the
extent to which the collective layoff announcement affects
consumer uncertainty and the trustworthiness and likeability
of the brand. We may expect that if more employees are laid
off, the adverse effects of the layoff announcement on sales and
price elasticity will be stronger. For advertising elasticity, the
effect of the number of employees being laid off depends on
whether, on average, the expected higher increase in uncer-
tainty as more employees are laid off, counteracts the expected
stronger decrease in likability and trustworthiness as more
employees are laid off.
Control variables. In our empirical investigation we also control
for other factors that may affect sales before and after the
collective layoff announcement. In particular, to identify the
magnitude of demand-side effects of a collective layoff
announcement, our model must contain data on supply-side
dynamics that may be affected by such collective layoffs. Thus,
as noted previously, we control for production capacity con-
straints that may drive lower sales for the firm (Bresnahan and
Ramey 1993), as reflected in production capacity utilization.
We also control for competitive sales, which may affect own-
firm sales positively (i.e., capturing overall market trends) or
negatively (i.e., capturing market-share stealing).
Empirical Study
In the automotive industry, our empirical context, collective
layoffs, including plant closures, by major international man-
ufacturers frequently occur both in the United States and in
many Western European countries (Bailey et al. 2010). In
North America, many manufacturing jobs have shifted from
the United States to Mexico, which has experienced a massive
investment in vehicle assembly in recent decades (Klier and
Rubenstein 2011). In Europe, automotive assembly has shifted
2 Note that Palmon, Sun, and Tang (1997) use a comparable classification.
They classify layoffs as supply-driven layoffs (also called “efficiency
layoffs”), which are aimed at, or result from, improved efficiency, and
demand-driven layoffs, which evolve from unfavorable market conditions.
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from Western Europe to lower-wage Eastern European coun-
tries (Klier and Rubenstein 2011; Klier and Rubenstein 2015).
In fact, automotive production in Poland, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Slovakia reached a record high in 2015 with the
production of 3.5 million units, making the region the second-
largest automotive hub in Europe, after Germany (The Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit 2016).
Data Collection
We combine four unique secondary data sets for this study.
First, we utilize data from R.L. Polk Automotive (now IHS)
regarding unit sales (i.e., new vehicle registrations) and list
prices for 20 major automotive brands between 2000 and
2015 in nine countries. The brands are Alfa Romeo, BMW,
Chevrolet, Chrysler, Citroen, Daihatsu, Fiat, Ford, Honda,
Mazda, Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Opel, Peugeot, Renault,
Seat, Suzuki, Toyota, and Volkswagen, and the countries are
Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.3 Each brand we ana-
lyze is among the top ten car sellers in at least one of the
countries we investigate. All the countries are automotive man-
ufacturing locations, and they include the countries of origin of
all of the aforementioned automotive brands (Alfa Romeo and
Fiat originate in Italy; Seat in Spain; BMW, Mercedes, and
Volkswagen in Germany; Chrysler, Chevrolet, and Ford in the
United States; Daihatsu, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan,
Subaru, Suzuki, and Toyota in Japan; Citroen, Peugeot, and
Renault in France).
Second, we utilize data from Focus Media (Austria), Kantar
(Japan and France), and Nielsen (all other countries) on
monthly advertising spending for all car models and corporate
advertising of the car brands and countries we consider. Third,
we use a unique data set, purchased from R.L. Polk Automotive
(now IHS), that covers the monthly production levels and the
maximum production capacity for all automotive plants of light
vehicles between the years 2000 and 2015, globally.
Fourth, for the countries, brands, and time periods we con-
sider, we manually collected data on collective layoff
announcements (n ¼ 205) in which a minimum of 90 employ-
ees were dismissed.4 We began with an internet search for basic
information on the factories that assemble cars of each of our
brands. We then built for each brand a list of factories world-
wide and noted the current status of each factory (open/closed/
sold), along with the year of closure or sale, when applicable.
Next, we focused on the countries in our data and obtained
detailed monthly information on factory closures (e.g., from
press coverage). We carried out an additional search using each
factory’s name and a range of relevant dates to search for
information on collective layoffs that did not involve plant
closures. We then validated our data by cross-checking among
different sources. Specifically, for the United States, we used a
report issued by the Center for Automotive Research (Bruge-
man, Hill, and Cregger 2011) that provided details on closed
(and repurposed) U.S. auto-manufacturing facilities. For Eur-
ope, we used the European Monitoring Center of Change data-
base (Eurofound 2019). In addition, we used Automotive News
Europe’s (2008) “Guide to Assembly Plants in Europe.”
Finally, we used the brands’ own websites. We scanned their
lists of existing factories to ensure that we had not missed any
collective layoff announcement and used the “Media Centers”
on their websites to obtain press releases on closure and dis-
missal announcements.
For every collective layoff announcement, we collected
information on the announced motive for the collective layoff
to code whether the layoffs were driven by a decline in demand
(i.e., “demand-driven”) or not. We codeed collective layoff as
demand-driven if a decline in demand was mentioned as a
cause of the collective layoffs. We also coded whether the
respective firm announcing the collective layoffs was domestic
or foreign in the layoff country. In addition, we gathered the
number of employees affected and the date (month and year) of
the announcement.5 To check data collection reliability, we
employed two independent research assistants to gather the
collective layoff announcement data. A third research assistant
examined the joint list of announcements gathered by the first
two to make sure there was full agreement across the two
announcement lists and, in the case of a disagreement, gather
the required information to resolve the inconsistency. The level
of agreement between the first two research assistants before
any disagreement resolution took place was high (95.6%).
Data Description
The 205 layoff announcements we analyze include 4 collective
layoffs in Austria, 15 in Canada, 37 in France, 20 in Germany, 8
in Italy, 13 in Japan, 31 in Spain, 22 in the United Kingdom, and
55 in the United States. The investigated collective layoff
announcements involved more than 300,000 employees. In sum-
mary, our empirical investigation utilizes 129,919 data points at
the model-month-country level. Each data point captures sales,
3 For Japan and France, our data set covers the years 2000–2013. Our data set
does not cover prices for Canada and Japan prior to 2007. Accordingly, we
eliminate from our analysis collective layoff events that occurred during these
periods and in these countries.
4 For each of the events, we also ensure that the brand’s models are also sold in
at least one of the other sample countries where there is no other collective
layoff announcement for that brand in the year before or after the event.
5 In the empirical tests presented in the following sections, we consider the
month in which the collective layoff was announced as the time of “treatment”
(rather than the month in which layoffs were expected to take effect). This
choice is based on the fact that, at the point of announcement, consumers are
exposed to information that may trigger mistrust and/or uncertainty. Moreover,
in many cases, the actual layoff date was not clearly conveyed in the layoff
announcements. Some indicated a general period within which the collective
layoffs would take place (e.g., a coming year or two years), others did not
mention the intended date at all, and still others announced effective dates that
ultimately differed from the actual effective dates. In some cases, for instance,
labor union negotiations or government interventions may shift the effective
date of a layoff, impeding the capacity of outside analysts to identify this date, a
task that becomes even more complicated across numerous events.
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advertising, pricing, and manufacturing information on a spe-
cific car model manufactured by a brand that announced a col-
lective layoff in the 12-month period before or after the given
month. In 118 announcements, a decline in demand was expli-
citly mentioned as a motive for the layoffs, and 105 of the
collective layoffs were announced by domestic brands.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation
matrix of our estimation data. Advertising spending, price, and
competitive sales are all measured at the country-model-month
level. We attribute corporate advertising spending (defined as
advertising spending for the car brand that does not promote
any specific car model) to the respective models, according to
their relative model-level sales. Competitive car sales include
all monthly sales for the respective country except those for the
respective car model. For production capacity utilization, we
first calculate for every plant of the brand the ratio between
actual monthly production and maximum production capacity.
Then, we calculate the production-weighted average of this
ratio across all plants of the brand in a given region. This
averaging is done for every month in our data to get the average
monthly regional production capacity utilization for the brand.6
Model-Free Evidence
In this section, we examine sales, advertising, and price data
before and after collective layoff announcements, without spe-
cifying a formal model. Such model-free evidence provides a
first rough view on how these variables change following col-
lective layoff announcements, albeit without the controls that
we incorporate into our formal estimation (such as for
endogeneity).
First, for each of the collective layoffs, we calculated the
percentage change in the layoff brand’s unit sales in the layoff
country, comparing postannouncement levels with prean-
nouncement levels. On average, the percentage change
between unit sales 12 months before and 12 months after the
announcement is 6.6%.7 For two-thirds of the layoff
announcements in our data set, we observe a negative change
in sales in the year following the announcement. These findings
provide preliminary evidence of the negative effects of collec-
tive layoffs on sales. Such evidence is preliminary because it
does not control for the nonrandomness of the layoffs (e.g., the
collective layoffs may happen precisely because demand for
the brand is in decline) or for potential supply-side constraints.
Moreover, it does not account for the nonrandomness in mar-
keting efforts (e.g., in advertising spending) before and after
the announcement. We address such issues with our formal
estimation technique.
Panels A and B of Figure 2 present the distribution of per-
cent change in sales for different collective layoff characteris-
tics. Panel A compares the distributions for domestic and
foreign collective layoff firms. We observe that, on average,
collective layoffs of domestic firms are associated with a sales
decrease of 5.5%, whereas layoffs for foreign firms are asso-
ciated with a sales decrease of 7.7%. Panel B compares the
distributions for demand-driven and non-demand-driven col-
lective layoff announcements. We find that, on average, col-
lective layoffs that are announced as demand-driven are
associated with a decrease in sales of 7.1%, whereas layoffs
that are non-demand-driven are associated with a decrease in
sales of 5.8%.
Second, we calculated the percentage change in the layoff
brand’s advertising spending in the layoff country, comparing
postannouncement levels with preannouncement levels. We
find that the median change in advertising spending is 2%,
suggesting that firms do not show a dominant tendency to
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix (for Model Estimation).
Label
Unit Sales
(at Model Level)c Advertisinga Priceb
Competitive
Sales
Production
Capacity Utilization
Advertisinga Advmjct .32**
Priceb Pricemjct .16** .09**
Competitive sales CompSalesmjct .42** .10** .06**
Production capacity utilization PCUjct .06** .05** .07** .01*
Mean 961 703,954 27,802 250,056 .71
SD 1,663 2,297,922 16,978 313,430 .10
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
aExpenditures in Euros for the car model.
bCar model price in Euros.
cUnit sales (at car-model level) refers to the monthly unit sales of a car model. Competitive sales refer to the sum of unit sales across all other models of all brands.
Notes: The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are based on the data we use for model estimation (i.e., the data correspond only to the 12-month periods
before and 12-month periods after all layoff announcements in the relevant countries for each collective layoff and across the respective car models for the brand).
In total, we use 129,919 data points for model estimation.
6 We use the term “region” to describe the production area to which a given
country belongs and in which its supply of cars is likely to be produced. The
regions are based on the definition of our production data provider, HIS, and
consist of Europe, North America, and Japan/Korea.
7 Percent change is calculated as postevent mean monthly levels over a period
of 12 months, minus pre-event mean levels over a period of 12 months, divided
by pre-event mean levels for the brand.
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substantially increase or decrease spending in the year follow-
ing a layoff announcement.8 Panels A and B of Figure 3 present
the distributions of percent change in advertising spending for
domestic and foreign collective layoff firms (Panel A), and for
demand-driven and non-demand-driven collective layoffs
(Panel B). We observe that a higher percentage of domestic
firms, compared with foreign firms, increased advertising
spending by up to 20% following a layoff announcement; yet
a higher proportion of foreign firms than domestic firms
increased advertising spending by more than 40% in the year
following the layoff announcement. Similarly, when compar-
ing demand-driven and non-demand-driven layoff announce-
ments, we observe that non-demand-driven announcements
were more likely than demand-driven announcements to be fol-
lowed by an increase in advertising spending of up to 20%,
whereas demand-driven announcements were more likely than
non-demand-driven announcements to be followed by an
increase in advertising spending of more than 40%.
Third, we calculated the percentage change in the layoff
brand’s car prices in the layoff country one year before and
one year after the collective layoff announcement. The average
price change across all announcements was 2.7%, with a major-
ity of cases (83%) in the range between 5% and 5% change.
We do not observe notable differences in the distribution of
price change between layoff announcements of domestic ver-
sus foreign firms or between layoff announcements that were
non-demand-driven versus demand-driven.
A DID Model for Sales, Advertising, and Pricing
Our econometric model should address three main challenges.
First, the collective layoffs are not random events but are deci-
sions that may be driven by expected demand fluctuations. This
concern is especially relevant when a drop in demand is given
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Figure 2. Percentage Change in Sales.
Notes: Percentage change is calculated as postevent mean monthly levels over a
period of 12 months, minus pre-event mean levels over a period of 12 months,
divided by pre-event mean levels for the brand.
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Figure 3. Percentage Changes in Ad Spending.
Notes: Percentage change is calculated as postevent mean monthly levels over a
period of 12 months, minus pre-event mean levels over a period of 12 months,
divided by pre-event mean levels for the brand.
8 Because of the high variance in the percentage change in advertising
spending, we find it more informative to present the median and not the
mean across the collective layoff events we investigate.
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as a motive for the collective layoffs. Second, advertising and
pricing are strategic decision variables, which are driven by
sales objectives and expectations. Third, unobservable shocks
may simultaneously affect sales, advertising spending, and
prices.
To address these challenges, we develop a hierarchical Baye-
sianmodel consisting of three dependent variables: sales, adver-
tising, and price. Accordingly, our model comprises a system of
three equations. To address the first form of endogeneity (non-
randomness of collective layoff announcements), our model
adopts a DID approach. In our data, we observe sales before and
after collective layoff announcements in a “treatment” country
(the treatment being the collective layoff announcement for a
given brand in a given country), which we can compare with
“control” countries (i.e., all countries other than the treatment
country in our data set in which we do not observe a collective
layoff announcement for that brand in the 12 months before or
after the focal collective layoff announcement).
The appropriateness of this DID approach is contingent on
two key assumptions that seem to be realistic in our context.
First, we assume that the collective layoff decision is taken at
the regional, and perhaps even global, production level, and not
in the layoff country in isolation; thus, the treatment is not
driven solely by the demand conditions in the treatment coun-
try. Second, we assume that the impact of collective layoff
announcements on consumer demand is country-specific. Typi-
cally, media outlets cover layoff announcements in their own
country more intensively than they cover announcements of
collective layoffs abroad. Consumers are more likely to be
aware of such announcements in their own country than in
other countries and to consider workers in their own country
as in-group members, compared with workers abroad.
To ease the interpretation of our DID model, we compare a
simulated “but-for” world—the world that would have existed
had a collective layoff announcement never occurred—to the
“actual” world—the world that exists given that the collective
layoff has occurred. We adopt this method from the legal and
economics literature (Hastings and Williams 2016); it has also
been used previously in marketing (Mahajan, Sharma, and
Buzzell 1993).
Figure 4 presents a stylized example. A line represents the
(stylized) actual sales of the BMW 3 Series in a collective
layoff country (in this case, the United States) and a bold line
represents the (stylized) actual sales of the BMW 3 Series in a
control country (in this case, Germany). At T*, BMW
announces a collective layoff in the United States. The “actual”
world comprises the observed sales of the BMW 3 Series in the
United States after T*, while the “but-for” world (depicted by a
dashed line) comprises the expected sales of the BMW 3 Series
in the United States, absent a collective layoff announcement of
BMW in the United States, based on the evolution of the sales
of the BMW 3 Series in the United States before T* and on the
sales of the BMW 3 Series in Germany before and after T*. The
difference between the “actual” sales levels in the United States
after T* (i.e., the full line) and the “but-for” sales levels in the
United States after T* (i.e., the dashed line) is the DID.
To address endogeneity in pricing and advertising spending,
we use an instrumental-variable procedure (Rossi, Allenby, and
McCulloch 2005). We utilize the periodic price and advertising
spending for the car model, averaged across the control coun-
tries, as instrumental variables for the periodic price and adver-
tising spending of a given car model (see the exact specification
next). These variables are correlated with pricing and advertis-
ing for the car model in the layoff country, because they may
∆DID
BMW 3 Series
U.S.: But-For 
BMW 3 Series 
U.S.: Actual
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Figure 4. Stylized Example for Sales of BMW 3 Series Before and After a Collective Layoff Event for BMW in the United States.
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capture the temporal global marketing strategy and cost func-
tion for that car model over time, as well as the temporal cost of
advertising. However, these variables are not expected to be
correlated with that model’s unit sales in the layoff country,
because potential buyers in that country are not likely to be
exposed to prices and advertising in other countries. Finally, we
allow for correlation in unobserved temporal shocks of the
three dependent variables, by specifying the errors of the three
equations in our system to be jointly distributed.
Model Specification
We start with the specification of Model 1, which focuses
on the main effects of collective layoff announcements on
sales, advertising elasticity, and price elasticity in the col-
lective layoff country. We then proceed to Model 2, which
further explores the role of our moderators in these main
effects.
The dependent variable in the first equation of Model 1 is
the log-transformed unit sales of car model m of brand j in
country c at month t (lnSalesmjct), as follows:
lnSalesmjct ¼ bSales0 jct þ bSales1 jct ln Advmjct þ 1
 
þ bSales2 jct ln Pricemjct
 þ dSales0 t þ gSales0m
þ gSales1m ln CompSalesmjct
 
þ
XL
l¼1
gSales2 lm ln Advmjc; t1 þ 1
 þ eSalesmjct :
ð1Þ
We log-transformed all the independent variables such that
the respective parameters denote the elasticities of the corre-
sponding variables. Advmjct represents the level of advertising
spending for car model m at time t in country c. Pricemjct
represents the price of car model m at time t in country c.
Accordingly, bSales1 jct and b
Sales
2 jct represent advertising and price
elasticities. As our theoretical expectations regarding advertis-
ing and price elasticities are at the brand-country level, we
specify these random parameters at the brand-country-time
level.
Similarly, bSales0 jct represents the baseline sales for brand j in
country c at time t, after controlling for the marketing mix and
other market conditions (Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe
2007). The inclusion of base sales allows us to obtain unbiased
estimates for advertising and price elasticities. Our model also
accounts for past advertising spillovers through the inclusion of
lagged advertising levels, captured by gSales2 lm . We utilize a grid
search for the number of lags. CompSalesmct represents com-
petitive car unit sales in country c at time t. dSales0 t and g
Sales
0m in
Equation 1 are random time and car model effects, respec-
tively. The parameters gSales02m and d
Sales
0 t are each drawn from
a normal distribution.
Following the principles of a DID model, our focal interest
is in whether time t is before or after the collective layoff
announcement, and whether country c is the treatment or a
control country. Accordingly, we specify the baseline sales,
as well as the advertising and price elasticity parameters
(bSales0 jct , b
Sales
1 jct , and b
Sales
2 jct , respectively), as follows:
bSaleskjct ¼ ySalesk;0 þ ySalesk;1 Post jct þ ySalesk;2 CLCountry jct
þ ySalesk;3 Post jct  CLCountry jct
þ ySalesk;4 PCUjct þ uSalesk; jct; k 2 0; 1; 2f g:
ð2Þ
Post jct is a vector of dummy variables that indicate whether
time t is before (12 months) or after (12 months) a collective
layoff announcement of brand j in country c. CLCountryjct is a
dummy variable indicating whether c is a collective layoff
country, in which case the variable is equal to 1 in the periods
surrounding the layoff announcement (from 12 months before
until 12 months after) and 0 otherwise. To clarify, assume that
Mazda has made a collective layoff announcement in Germany
in March 2012. For all Mazda car models, Postjct is 0 for all
time periods before March 2012 and 1 for time periods from
March 2012 to February 2013. CLCountryjct is equal to 1 for all
Mazda car models in Germany between March 2011 and Feb-
ruary 2013, and equal to 0 otherwise. Thus, for the collective
layoff announcement in question (and, similarly, for any col-
lective layoff announcement) we might see Post/CLCountry
combinations of 0/0 (e.g., Austria before the announcement
[i.e., between March 2011 and February 2012), 0/1 (Germany
before the announcement [i.e., between March 2011 and Feb-
ruary 2012), 1/0 (e.g., Austria after the announcement [i.e.,
between March 2012 and February 2013), and 1/1 (Germany
after the announcement [i.e., between March 2012 and Febru-
ary 2013).9
PCUjct in Equation 2 is the production-weighted average pro-
duction capacity utilization of brand j at month t in the region
corresponding to country c. The error terms uSalesk; jct are assumed to
be uncorrelated with eSalesmjct and jointly distributed as u
Sales
0; jct ;

uSales1; jct ; u
Sales
2; jct Þ*N 0; Sð Þ, where S¼
s2B0 sB1;B0 sB2;B0
sB1;B0 s2B1 sB2;B1
sB2;B0 sB2;B1 s2B2
2
64
3
75.
Next, we further specify an advertising equation and a price
equation in our system (Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch 2005).
We specify the advertising equation as follows:
ln Advmjct þ 1
  ¼ bAdv0 jct þ dAdv0 t þ gAdv0m
þ gAdv1m ln CompSalesmjct
 
þ
XL
l¼1
gAdv2 lm ln Advmjc; t l þ 1
 
þ gAdv3m Advmj c0 t þ eAdvmjct:
ð3Þ
The instrumental variable for car model advertising is
Advmjc0t, which is calculated as the level of advertising spend-
ing for model m at time t, averaged across all countries in
which there was no collective layoff announcement for brand
9 Web Appendix B contains a description of how we stacked the DID variables
for the estimation of our model using a stylized example.
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j in the 12 months preceding or following the collective layoff
announcement.10
bAdv0 jct in Equation 3 represents baseline advertising levels at
the brand-country-time level. We allow for the possible influ-
ence of the collective layoff announcement and its character-
istics on base advertising by specifying this intercept as
follows:
bAdv0 jct ¼ yAdv0 þ yAdv1 Post jct þ yAdv2 CLCountry jct
þ yAdv3 Post jct  CLCountry jct þ yAdv4 PCUjct þ uAdvjct :
ð4Þ
All variables in Equation 4 are defined as previously. The
error term uAdvjct is assumed to be uncorrelated with e
Adv
mjct and
distributed as N 0; z2Adv
 
.
We specify the price equation in our system as follows:
ln Pricemjct
  ¼ bPrice0 jct þ dPrice0 t þ gPrice0m
þ gPrice1m ln CompSalesmjct
 
þ
XL
l¼1
gPrice2 lm ln Advmjc;tl þ 1
 
þ gPrice3m Pricemj c0 t þ ePricemjct :
ð5Þ
The instrumental variable for car model price is Pricemjc0t,
which is calculated as the price of car model m at time t,
averaged across all countries where there was no collective
layoff announcement for brand j in the 12 months preceding
or following the layoff announcement.11
bPrice0 jct in Equation 5 represents the baseline price at the
brand-country-time level. Similarly to what we did in the sales
and advertising equations and for similar reasons, we specify
this intercept as follows:
bPrice0 jct ¼ yPrice0 þ yPrice1 Post jct þ yPrice2 CLCountry jct
þ yPrice3 Post jct  CLCountry jct
þ yPrice4 PCUjct þ uPricejct :
ð6Þ
All variables inEquation 6 are defined as previously. The error
termuPricejct is assumed tobeuncorrelatedwith e
Price
mjct anddistributed
as N 0; z2Price
 
. The parameters gAdv03m, g
Price
03m, d
Adv
0 t and d
Price
0 t are
each drawn from a normal distribution. We model the errors of
Equations 1, 3, and 5 to be jointly distributed as eSalesmjct ; e
Adv
mjct;
ePricemjct

*N 0; Seð Þ, where Se ¼
s2S s S;A sS; P
sS;A s2A sA; P
s S; P sA; P s2P
2
64
3
75.
Exploring the Moderating Role of Collective Layoff
Characteristics
Model 1 allows us to test the change in marketing-mix elasti-
cities following collective layoff announcements across all
announcement types. To explore the role of our moderators
in this variance, we proceeded to specify Model 2. This model
is similar to Model 1, with the exception of the second-layer
equations for bSales0 jct , b
Sales
1 jct , b
Sales
2 jct , b
Adv
0 jct and b
Price
0 jct . These first-
level parameters are specified to depend also on the character-
istics of the collective layoff announcements as follows:
bEq:kjct ¼ yEq:k;0 þ yEq:k;1Post jct þ yEq:k;2CLCountry jct
þ yEq:k;3Post jct  CLCountry jct þ yEq:k;4PCUjct
þ yEq:k;5Domestic jct þ yEq:k;6MotiveDjct
þ yEq:k;7 ln Employees jct
 þ yEq:k;8CLCountry jct
Domestic jct þ yEq:k;9CLCountry jct MotiveD jct
þ yEq:k;10Post jct  Domestic jct
þ yEq:k;11Post jct MotiveDjct
þ yEq:k;12Post jct  CLCountry jct  Domestic jct
þ yEq:k;13Post jct  CLCountry jct MotiveDjct
þ yEq:k;14Post jct  CLCountry jct  ln Employees jct
 
þuEq:k; jct0 Eq: 2 Sales; Adv; Pricef g k 2 0; 1; 2f g:
ð7Þ
Domesticjct in Equation 7 is a dummy variable that equals 1
if brand j is a domestic brand in the collective layoff country,
and 0 otherwise. MotiveDjct is a dummy variable that equals 1
if the layoff is driven by a decline in demand and 0 otherwise.
Employeesjct is the announced number of employees to be laid
off. This variable is positive in the 12 months following the
layoff announcement, and 0 otherwise.12
Estimation Results
We jointly estimated the sales, advertising, and price equations
of Model 1 using a hierarchical Bayesian estimation technique.
We ran the algorithm for 5,000 iterations. The first 4,000 itera-
tions were used for burn-in, and every tenth iteration of the last
1,000 was saved to obtain the posterior parameter estimates.
We graphically plotted these estimates to examine their con-
vergence (plots are available on request). Table 3 presents the
10 Because scales of advertising spending levels may vary greatly across
countries with different population sizes, for the construction of this variable
we first standardize advertising spending at the country level for each car
model and then take the monthly average across the relevant countries (i.e.,
across all control countries).
11 For price, the independent variable distribution is very similar to that
reported in Table 2 (M ¼ 28,007, SD ¼ 16,849). For advertising, because
the independent variable is constructed by first standardizing advertising at
the country and car-model level over the 15-year period we consider, the
distribution is somewhat different from that of our advertising variable (M ¼
126.10, SD ¼ 14,645).
12 Because this variable is specified as zero in all pre-event months, in
Equation 7 we do not include all interaction terms between Employeesjct and
Postjct.
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estimation results of the second-layer parameters of
bSales0 jct , b
Sales
1 jct , b
Sales
2 jct , b
Adv
0 jct, and b
Price
0 jct .
In this article, we focus on the effect of collective layoff
announcements on sales, advertising elasticity, and price elas-
ticity. For sales, the effect of such announcements is composed,
in part, of their potential effect on marketing-mix variables and
marketing-mix elasticities. For this reason, we cannot assess
the effect of collective layoffs solely on the bases of changes in
the intercept of the sales equation. Therefore, we start by
reviewing the estimation results for the effect of collective
layoffs on marketing-mix elasticities. That is, the interaction
effects between a postannouncement period and the layoff
country, y1,3 and y2,3, in the second-layer equations of the two
elasticity parameters bSales1 jct and b
Sales
2 jct (see Equation 2 and col-
umns 4 and 5 in Table 3). Subsequently, we simulate the over-
all effect of collective layoffs on sales on the basis of a
comparison of “but-for” and “actual’ sales.
We find that these DID interaction parameters are negative
and significant in both the advertising elasticity and the price
elasticity equations, indicating that both elasticities are lower
following a collective layoff announcement than absent the
announcement ( ySales1;3 ¼ .02; ySales2;3 ¼ .11). These signifi-
cant changes in advertising and price elasticities represent a
9.8% drop in advertising elasticity, and a 19.2% drop in
price elasticity.
While these findings show that more than 95% of the poster-
ior distribution of each of the DID interaction parameters is
negative both for advertising elasticity and for price elasticity,
we observe substantial variance in both parameter distribu-
tions. Next, we investigate the moderating role of the collective
layoff communication characteristics in the effects of the DID
interaction parameters.
The Role of Collective Layoff Characteristics
Table 4 presents the estimation results of Model 2. We focus on
the estimated interaction parameters between a postannounce-
ment period, a collective layoff country, and the announcement
characteristics, for advertising elasticity and price elasticity,
y1,12, y2,12, y1,13, y2,13, y1,14 and y2,14 (see columns 4 and 5 in
Table 4).
We find that a collective layoff announcement of a domestic
firm is associated with lower postlayoff advertising and price
elasticity than a collective layoff announcement of a foreign
firm ( ySales1;12 ¼ .07; ySales2;12 ¼ .16). The stronger decrease in
advertising elasticity for domestic firms than for foreign firms
is as expected. The stronger decrease in price elasticity for
domestic firms, is in line with the expectation that domestic
firms experience a greater decrease in likability and trust-
worthiness than foreign firms following collective layoff
announcements.
For layoff motive, we find that a collective layoff announce-
ment that is demand-driven is associated with lower postlayoff
price elasticities (a less negative elasticity) than a non-demand-
driven announcement ( ySales2;13 ¼ .12). This finding is in line with
the expectation that, following demand-driven layoff
announcements, firms experience a smaller decrease in likabil-
ity and trustworthiness than following collective layoff
announcements that mention other motives.
For the announced number of affected employees, we find
that a collective layoff announcement that involves more
employees is associated with higher postlayoff advertising
elasticities than a collective layoff announcement that involves
fewer employees ( ySales1;14 ¼ .01). This finding is consistent with
the expected higher consumer uncertainty following collective
layoff announcement the more employees that are laid off as
well as the increased informative role of advertising in such
situations.
Collective Layoff Announcements, Advertising Spending,
and Prices
To examine the effect of a collective layoff announcement on
advertising spending and prices, we elaborate on the estimation
results of Model 2, which incorporates all moderators. Col-
umns 6 and 7 in Table 4 present the (Model 2) estimation
results of the second-layer parameters of base advertising
spending and base prices (bAdv0 jct and b
Price
0 jct ). These results
Table 3. Estimation Results of Second-Layer Equations, Model 1.
Variable (Parameter)
Base Brand
Sales
bSales0 jct
Brand Advertising
Elasticity
bSales1jct
Brand Price
Elasticity
bSales2 jct
Base Brand
Advertising
bAdv0jct
Brand
Prices
bPrice1jct
Intercept (y0) 6.8
[6.03, 7.44]
.09
[.08, .10]
.80
[.86, .73]
9.15
[8.73, 9.41]
.01
[.003, .02]
Post period (y1) 1.58
[1.93, 1.18]
.04
[.04, .05]
.10
[.07, .13]
.04
[.03, .14]
.01
[.002, .02]
Collective layoff country (y2) 2.56
[2.95, 2.05]
.03
[.02, .05]
.26
[.21, .29]
.39
[.28, .53]
.03
[.04, .02]
Collective layoff country  Post period (y3) 1.45
[.87, 2.15]
.02
[.03, .004]
.11
[.16, .06]
.06
[.25, .06]
.02
[.00, .03]
Production capacity utilization (y4) 2.82
[4.52, 2.14]
.06
[.08, .04]
.40
[.31, .52]
.82
[.65, .98]
.03
[.01, .05]
Notes: Boldfaced parameters indicate that 95% of the posterior distribution is above/below zero. The estimation is based on 129,919 observations.
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indicate that advertising spending is lower after a collective
layoff announcement of a domestic brand than after a collective
layoff announcement of a foreign brand ( yAdv0;12 ¼ .27). The
effect of a collective layoff announcement on car prices, how-
ever, does not seem to differ across announcements with dif-
ferent characteristics.
Marginal Effects of Collective Layoff Announcements on
Advertising and Price Elasticities
The marginal effects of collective layoff announcements are
captured by the second-layer parameters of each elasticity cor-
responding to a postannouncement period in a collective layoff
country (see Equation 7). These marginal effects on bSales1 jct and
bSales2 jct are calculated as follows:
Marginal q ¼ ySalesq;3 þ ySalesq;11  Domestic jct þ ySalesq;12 MotiveD jct
þ ySalesq;13  ln Employees
 
; q 2 1; 2f g:
ð8Þ
Subscript q takes the value of 1 if it refers to advertising
elasticity ðbSales1 jct Þ, and 2 if it refers to price elasticity (bSales2 jct ). To
account for layoff characteristics, we plug in Equation 8 all
possible value combinations of Domesticjct and MotiveDjct. For
layoff size, we utilize the mean number of employees across all
layoff announcements we analyze. In line with the Bayesian
estimation approach, the calculation must account for para-
meter uncertainty. We thus utilize all draws from the posterior
distributions of the parameters in Equation 8 to calculate pos-
terior draws of the marginal effects.
Table 5 presents the posterior means of the marginal
effects on advertising elasticity and price elasticity, across
possible values of the layoff announcement characteristics
we examine, based on the estimates of Model 2. We find a
significant decrease in advertising elasticity only following
layoff announcements by domestic firms. We find a signifi-
cant negative change in price elasticity (i.e., a more negative
price elasticity) following all announcement types, with the
exception of a collective layoff announcement of a foreign
firm that is presented as being demand-driven. We further see
that the largest mean marginal change in price elasticity is
Table 4. Estimation Results of Second-Layer Equations, Model 2.
Variable (Parameter)
Base Brand
Sales
bSales0jct
Brand Advertising
Elasticity
bSales1jct
Brand Price
Elasticity
bSales2 jct
Base Brand
Advertising
bAdv0jct
Brand
Prices
bPrice1jct
Intercept (y0) 5.41
[4.65, 6.17]
.10
[.09, .12]
.70
[.78 –.64]
8.81
[8.45, 9.11]
.04
[.03, .06]
Post period (y1) .18
[1.39, 1.24]
.03
[.00, .06]
.03
[.14, .08]
.20
[.08, .44]
.05
[.02, .08]
Collective layoff country (y2) 3.30
[4.25, 2.19]
.04
[.01, .05]
.29
[.20, .39]
.04
[.24, .16]
.01
[.02, .03]
Collective layoff country  Post period (y3) 2.44
[.17, 4.25]
.06
[.11, .02]
.17
[.33, .04]
.01
[.55, .53]
.04
[.10, .02]
Production capacity utilization (y4) 3.55
[4.60, 2.76]
.06
[.07, .04]
.43
[.36, .52]
.77
[.57, .96]
.03
[.00 .04]
Domestic brand (y5) 1.06
[.32, 1.68]
.02
[.03, .00]
.11
[.17, .06]
.37
[.51, .25]
8.46E-04
[.01, .02]
Stated motive: demand (y6) .08
[.41, .75]
.01
[.03, .00]
1.91E-04
[.04, .06]
.19
[.19, .07]
.01
[.03, .00]
Number of employees (y7) .04
[.19, .12]
.004
[.007, .001]
.01
[.00, .02]
.04
[.06, .00]
.01
[.01, .00]
Collective layoff country  Domestic brand (y8) 2.15
[3.30, .97]
.02
[.01, .05]
.25
[.14, .34]
.91
[.68, 1.19]
.05
[.07, .02]
Collective layoff country  MotiveD (y9) 2.86
[1.60, 4.10]
.03
[.05, .00]
.23
[.35, .14]
.04
[.16, .42]
.05
[.07, .02]
Post period  Domestic brand (y10) 1.90
[2.69, 1.26]
.05
[.03, .06]
.14
[.09, .21]
.07
[.08, .25]
.002
[.01, .02]
Post period  MotiveD (y11) .62
[1.40, .12]
.03
[.02, .05]
.02
[.05, .08]
.18
[.03, .36]
.02
[.00, .03]
Post period  Collective layoff
country  Domestic brand
(y12) 2.32
[.52, 3.69]
.07
[.10, .04]
.16
[.27, .01]
.27
[.58, .05]
.02
[.01, .06]
Post period  Collective layoff
country  MotiveD
(y13) 1.29
[2.66, .07]
.002
[.04, .02]
.12
[.03, .26]
.17
[.48, .16]
.01
[.03, .04]
Post period  Collective layoff
country  Employees
(y14) .17
[.43, .13]
.01
[.00, .02]
.01
[.02, .03]
.02
[.04, .09]
.01
[.00, .01]
Notes: Boldfaced parameters indicate that 95% of the posterior distribution is above/below zero. The estimation is based on 129,919 observations.
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expected for non-demand-driven layoff announcements of
domestic firms.
Other Effects
Table 6 presents the results of the estimations of the car-model-
level parameters in Equations 1, 3, and 5. We find that com-
petitive sales and lagged advertising have positive effects on
unit sales ( gSales1m ¼ .68, gSales2;1m ¼ .16) and on advertising spend-
ing (gAdv1m ¼ .17; gAdv2;1m ¼ .60). Competitive sales also have a
significant negative effect on prices (gPrice1m ¼ .04). We also
find that both instrumental variables have significant positive
effects on advertising spending and car price (gAdv3mj ¼ .23,
gPrice3mj ¼.30). As we expected, production capacity utilization,
which we added as a control variable, has a significant effect
on brand sales (ySales0;4 ¼ 3.55; see Table 3).
“Actual” to “But-For” Comparisons Across
Announcement Types
Next, we examine the economic significance of our statistical
findings, using the “but-for” analysis we introduced previ-
ously.13 For this calculation, “actual” sales are the observed
sales in our data. “But-for” sales (BFSalesmjct) are the corre-
sponding predicted sales, based on our estimation results, had
the collective layoff announcement not occurred. We calculate
these predicted values, ln BFSalesmjct , as follows:
ln BFSalesmjct ¼ b^Salespre;0 jct þ b^
Sales
pre;1 jct ln BFAdvmjct þ 1
 
þ b^Salespre;2 jct ln BFPricemjct
 
þ d^Sales0 t þ g^Sales0mj þ g^Sales1mj ln CompSalesmjct
 
þ
XL
l¼1
g^Sales2 lmj ln BFAdvmjc; t1 þ 1
 
þ e^Salesmjct j;
ð9Þ
where b^
Eq
pre; qjct are the mean time-varying brand-level para-
meter estimates in prelayoff periods. These parameters replace
the periodic postannouncement first-level parameters to simu-
late the “but-for” condition14 and are specified as follows:
b^
Eq:
pre; qjct ¼ mean b^
Eq:
qjc t1;t12ð Þ
 
;
Eq: 2 0; 1; 2f g; q 2 0; 1; 2f g; t ¼ event time:
ð10Þ
BFAdvmjct and BFPricemjct in Equation 9 are predicted after
the layoff announcement “but-for” values for advertising and
price, respectively, which are calculated as follows:
Table 6. Estimation Results: Car-Model-Level Parameters.
Parameter Sales Equation Advertising Equation Price Equation
Competitive sales ðgEq:1mÞ .68
[.65, .72]
.17
[.13, .17]
.04
[.04, –.03]
Lag advertising ðgEq:2 lm; lagÞ .16
[.15, .17]
.60
[.59, .61]
2.15E-04
[.001, .001]
Mean advertising in control countries (gAdv3m ) .23
[.21, .27]
Mean price in control countries (gPrice3m ) .30
[.27, .31]
Notes: Boldfaced parameters indicate that 95% of the posterior distribution is above/below zero.
For car model effects presented in this table, we report the hyperparameter (i.e., the means across car models).
Table 5. Mean Change in Advertising Elasticity and Price Elasticity.
Domestic: Demand Domestic: Nondemand Foreign: Demand Foreign: Nondemand
Advertising elasticity .06 .06 n.s. n.s.
Price elasticity .16 .28 n.s. .12
Notes: n.s. ¼ not significant. Boldfaced parameters indicate that 95% of the posterior distribution is above/below zero.
13 While some scholars view “but-for” causation as a special case of
counterfactual analysis used to compare real-world outcomes with those in a
world in which a harmful action has not happened (Pearl 2009; Spellman, and
Kincannon 2001), others distinguish between counterfactual and potential
outcome causation and “but-for” causation (Cox, Popken, and Sun 2018).
According to Cox, Popken, and Sun (2018), in a typical counterfactual and
potential outcome causation test, modeling assumptions derive a hypothetical
world in which there is one unit less of some cause variable leading to a certain
difference in an outcome variable. The logic behind a “but-for” causation claim
is that a cause (collective layoffs in our case) creates a response that would
otherwise not have occurred. Such causation can be claimed as long as other
conditions are controlled for in the empirical investigation so that the mere
cause suffices to create the response. A DID approach is a suitable empirical
setting for the investigation of such causation type.
14 The prelayoff parameters are used here as a proxy for “but-for” postlayoff
parameters. The true “but-for” parameters also account for changes in
postlayoff parameters in the control condition.
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ln BFVAdvmjct þ 1
 
¼ b^Advpre;0 jct þ d^
Adv
0 t þ g^Adv0m
þ g^Adv1m ln CompSalesmjct
 
þ
XL
l¼1
g^ Adv2lm ln Advmjc; t1 þ 1
 
þ g^Adv4m Advmjc0t þ e^Advmjct;
ð11Þ
ln BFPricemjct
 
¼ b^Pricepre;0 jct þ d^
Price
0 t þ g^Price0m
þ g^Price1m ln CompSalesmjct
 
þ
XL
l¼1
g^Price2 lm ln Advmjc; t1 þ 1
 
þ g^Price4m Pricemjc0t þ e^Pricemjct :
ð12Þ
The values of all other parameters in Equations 9 to 12 are
the estimated values of Model 1 parameters (see Table 3). The
error terms, e^Salesmjct , e^
Adv
mjct, and e^
Price
mjct , are drawn from a multi-
nomial normal distribution e^Salesmjct ; e^
Adv
mjct; e^
Price
mjct
 
*N 0; S^ e
 
,
where S^ e is the estimated variance–covariance matrix of the
error terms of our three model equations. In line with our
Bayesian estimation approach, the calculation of “but-for” val-
ues must account for parameter uncertainty. We thus calculate
probabilistic “but-for” values using all estimated draws from
the parameters’ posterior distributions.
We compare the “actual” and “but-for” values for sales,
advertising, and prices and calculate the percentage change
between the actual, observed values and the calculated, “but-
for” values for every postlayoff announcement period in our
sample. We average these changes for each collective layoff
announcement, across all the car models for the respective
brand.
“Actual” to “but-for” sales comparisons. The mean percentage
change between “actual” and “but-for” sales across our collec-
tive layoff announcements is 8.7%. This indicates that, on
average, for the brands in our sample, sales are 8.7% lower in
the year following the announcement than their expected level
absent the announcement. This drop in sales is somewhat larger
than the actual drop of 6.6% that we observed in the model-free
section. Across announcements with different characteristics,
we find that the mean percentage change between “actual” and
“but-for” sales is 8.8%, 8.7%, 7.9%, and 9.9%, for
announcements of domestic firms, announcements of foreign
firms, demand-driven announcements, and non-demand-driven
announcements, respectively.
“Actual” to “but-for” comparisons for advertising and prices. To
investigate whether and how firms make changes in advertising
spending and pricing after issuing collective layoff announce-
ments, we also calculate the percentage change between
“actual” and “but-for” advertising spending and price levels
(see Equations 11 and 12). For advertising spending, we find
that the mean percentage change between “actual” and “but-
for” spending across the layoff announcements in our data set is
16%.15 In fact, for 84% of the layoff announcements, we find
that actual advertising for the brand is lower than the predicted
“but-for” value. These findings indicate that many firms spend
less on advertising in the year following collective layoff
announcements than they would have been expected to spend
absent the announcements.
For pricing, our estimates suggest that the difference
between “actual” and “but-for” prices is very low. The mean
percentage difference is 1%, indicating that firms do not seem
to change their pricing strategy following collective layoff
announcements.
We further separately calculated the percentage change
compared to the “but-for” scenario due to the lower
marketing-mix elasticities, keeping the actual (observed)
advertising and pricing levels. We find that the mean drop in
sales due to the change in elasticities is 5.1% compared with
“but-for” sales. This finding indicates that the elasticity com-
ponent is responsible, on average, for 58% of the predicted
change in sales due to the collective layoff announcement.
Robustness
To examine the robustness of our findings, we estimated three
simple models based on our full model: an ordinary least
squares regression for sales; a seemingly unrelated regression
model with sales, advertising, and price as dependent variables;
and a two-stage least-squares model for sales, where advertis-
ing and price are treated as endogenous. While such models
have certain limitations—such as the fact that they do not
address heterogeneity or endogeneity—they may still provide
a sanity check of our DID approach. We compared the esti-
mates obtained with these models (i.e., the main effects of
collective layoff announcements on advertising and price elas-
ticities that we obtain as well as the moderating effects of the
three layoff characteristics on these main effects) with the esti-
mates of our main model (see Web Appendix C). In total, we
corroborated the face validity of eight coefficients (main DID
effect and three moderating effects on that main effect, for each
elasticity). For advertising elasticity, we find all coefficients to
be robust across all estimation methodologies. For price elas-
ticity, two out of four coefficients identified in the main model
are not replicated with the alternate simpler models. We there-
fore recommend that readers interpret our price elasticity find-
ings with more caution than our advertising elasticity findings.
We carried out several additional robustness checks to fur-
ther test the validity of our results. First, we estimated a model
that takes into account the global (instead of regional) average
production capacity utilization for the brand. We also checked
15 Due to the high variance in the “actual” to “but-for” comparisons in
advertising spending, for the calculation of average changes across the
collective layoff announcements we investigate, we replace all values greater
than a 300% increase (13 cases) by a fixed value of 300%.
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the production capacity utilization in the plants corresponding
to the collective layoff announcements in our sample. For 6 of
the 205 announcements, we found that the production capacity
utilization of the plant in the year following the announcement
was greater than 90%.16 We estimated our model excluding
these six announcements and found all our results to be robust.
Second, we examined the types of laid-off employees. We
found that 172 announcements mentioned production workers,
8 mentioned research-and-development (or design) workers, 23
mentioned “headquarters” workers (e.g., management, market-
ing, sales, finance), and 15 provided no information regarding
the types of employees involved. Note that more than one type
of employee could be mentioned in a single layoff announce-
ment. These data suggest that although it is common in the
automotive industry for production workers to be affected by
collective layoffs, other employees might also be involved in
such layoffs. As a robustness check, we estimated the model
using only events that mention production workers as the type
of employee to be laid off and found the same effects.
Third, we varied the total observation window for a collec-
tive layoff between 18 months (6 months before and 12 months
after the announcement) and 24 months (12 months before and
12 months after the announcement). Again, we found our
results to be robust. In summary, our main results show high
robustness over all these alternative model specifications (esti-
mation results of these models appear in Web Appendix C).
Implications
This article examines the commercial consequences of collec-
tive layoff announcements using data on 205 collective layoff
announcements that affected more than 300,000 employees. It
offers several implications for managers whose firms are con-
sidering initiating collective layoffs or are experiencing the
commercial consequences of such layoffs, and for market ana-
lysts studying collective layoff announcements and their
consequences.
Collective layoffs are likely to entail negative demand con-
sequences for the firms that initiate them. We observed that the
majority of brands in our data set that issued collective layoff
announcements (two out of three) faced a drop in sales, in
absolute terms, in the layoff country during the year following
the announcement. Using our model estimates, we showed that,
on average, sales following collective layoff announcements
are 8.7% lower than their expected level absent the announce-
ments. These changes result, in part, from lower advertising
elasticity, potentially higher price sensitivity, and lower adver-
tising spending following the layoff announcements. Given
these robust findings, we suggest that firms should go beyond
supply considerations when they consider downsizing and inte-
grate consumers’ response in their decision calculus.
Specifically, firms should include marketers in the task forces
that manage collective layoffs, beyond functional representa-
tives of other areas, such as operations and finance.
Our findings also provide essential insights to marketers as
they ponder whether the marketing instruments they have at
their disposal (e.g., advertising, price) may dampen adverse
demand effects. We find that advertising elasticity and price
elasticity typically decrease following layoff announcements.
At the same time, we also find that firms, on average, spend
less on advertising in the layoff country following layoff
announcements than they would absent the announcements.
Given the lower advertising elasticity following collective lay-
off announcements, it seems likely that decreasing or even
merely sustaining advertising spending in the layoff country
will lead to lower sales in that country and a loss of market
share. Lowering advertising spending as a response to a
decrease in advertising elasticity may be considered the opti-
mal solution to a marketing-mix allocation problem (Nichols
2013). However, to counteract a negative demand spiral fol-
lowing collective layoff announcements, marketers might con-
sider increasing their investment in advertising in the
respective country following the layoff announcement, as long
as advertising elasticity remains positive, to correct for lower
advertising elasticity. Layoff firms could also consider such a
temporary increase in advertising spending as a restructuring
cost.
For pricing, we propose that increased price sensitivity can-
not universally form a basis for price cuts to support brand
share in the affected country. Of course, other reasons may
exist for temporary price cuts in the respective country. We
do recognize that this article is only a first attempt at addressing
this question and that future research is needed to provide more
guidance on pricing implications.
Beyond the implications of our results for managers, the
analytical framework we have developed is also relevant for
internal analysts who study the impact of collective layoffs.
The heterogeneity we observed in consumer response suggests
that analysts should carefully tailor the sample and variables to
suit the specific context that they wish to investigate, in terms
of the type of firm that is affected, or the reason for the col-
lective layoff, given the heterogeneity in consumer response
we have found. On such a tailored sample, marketing analysts
could then utilize our model framework and retrieve simulation
results for different scenarios (considering, for instance, differ-
ent advertising spending levels). As with any prediction tool
that deals with a market shock, one should not expect total
accuracy; nevertheless, we suggest that such a tool can stimu-
late important discussions in management teams on the com-
mercial consequences of collective layoffs. From our
discussions with practitioners who have been involved in such
collective layoff decisions (including representatives of two
companies whose brands are included in our data set, i.e.,
Volkswagen and General Motors), we have learned that deci-
sion makers primarily tend to take manufacturing efficiency
considerations into account while generally ignoring potential
demand consequences. The tools proposed herein have the
16 The mean production capability utilization in our data is .71 (see Table 2). In
only 9% of our observations the production capability utilization is higher than
90%.
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potential to help marketers in downsizing firms to draw more
attention to demand consequences.
Our work can also prove useful to external business ana-
lysts. The media often ask such external experts to predict the
consequences of collective layoffs on the layoff brand or on its
consumers. Similarly, our results could be informative for
economists trying to predict broader economic impacts of lay-
offs. From our findings, three conclusions are worth keeping in
mind. First, a negative impact on sales is more likely than no
impact at all. Second, the impact on sales is likely to be rather
large (8.7%, on average). Third, the exact magnitude of this
effect depends on the characteristics of the announcements.
Analysts can code the collective layoff announcement on the
characteristics that we have analyzed and make inferences from
our results regarding whether the impact of the collective layoff
on demand will be more or less severe than the average.
Limitations and Directions for Further
Research
This study opens up many new directions for future research.
First, although our data set is rich, spanning 16 years with
monthly periodicity, nine countries, and 20 automotive brands,
the empirical analysis focused on only one industry. Replica-
tion of our results in other industries would be valuable. More-
over, even within the automotive industry, collection of more
data could enable researchers to gain additional insights regard-
ing the boundary conditions of collective layoff effects. For
instance, the collective layoffs we considered mostly affected
factory workers, and thus we were not able to closely examine
differential effects of layoffs of different categories of employ-
ees. An extensive data set on layoffs of employees in different
roles (e.g., customer-facing employees) would contribute
toward addressing this gap. Similarly, all firms in our data set
were multinational; data on both multinational as well as
national companies would allow for an examination of poten-
tial contrasts between reducing the overall labor force versus
shifting the labor force proportionally from one country to
another. We also studied only data on employee downsizing;
future research could also study the consequences of upsizing
the labor force.
Second, in this article, we studied the effects of collective
layoff announcements, rather than their actual execution.
Although our data do not permit us to identify potential differ-
ences between announcement and execution, we believe that
the study of such differences and their consequences, while
challenging from a data perspective, would provide additional
value.
Third, drawing from prior theory, we were able to identify
mechanisms that might underlie consumers’ responses to col-
lective layoffs and to firms’ marketing-mix decisions in the
wake of such layoffs; however, our (secondary, behavioral)
data did not enable us to prove that these mechanisms were
indeed at play. It would be interesting to explore and prove
such mediation mechanisms, potentially utilizing primary data
collected before and after collective layoffs are announced.
Online chatter that takes place before and after a layoff
announcement would be a useful source of such data.
Fourth, our study constitutes a first exploratory step in elu-
cidating the role of announcement characteristics in the com-
mercial consequences of collective layoffs, examining three
characteristics of interest. Future research should focus on the
multitudes of additional communication characteristics that are
likely to be worthy of study. For example, it would be interest-
ing to examine the extent to which a firm’s presence on social
media or the sentiment of the news coverage about a collective
layoff affect its commercial consequences. Such investigations
could also offer a tighter connection with the mediation
mechanism than the current study offers.
Marketing scholars have started to show an interest in col-
lective layoffs only relatively recently, many years after their
colleagues in economics, organizational behavior, and finance
began to do so. Accordingly, the knowledge at our disposal
remains limited. Our work provides several promising insights
regarding the nuanced interplay between the characteristics of
the communication of collective layoffs and their marketing
outcomes.
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